江苏科技信息 ›› 2019, Vol. 36 ›› Issue (8): 15-17.doi: 10.1004-7530/2019-36-8-15

• 管理与创新 • 上一篇    下一篇

企业并购中目标公司隐性债务防范机制初探——以企业股权收购为例

栾维栋   

  1. 太原工业学院 法学系,山西 太原 030008
  • 出版日期:2019-03-20 发布日期:2019-07-09
  • 作者简介:栾维栋(1989— ),男,甘肃陇西人,助教,硕士;研究方向:民商法。

Research on the target company’s hidden debt prevention mechanism in merger and acquisition:taking enterprise equity acquisition as an example

Weidong Luan   

  1. Law School, Taiyuan Institute of Technology, Taiyuan 030008, China
  • Online:2019-03-20 Published:2019-07-09

摘要:

并购动机理论认为企业基于市场运行竞争的压力,通过选择并购来消除或者控制行业竞争者以提升自身实力,保持市场竞争中的有利地位和竞争优势。但是企业若在并购前对目标公司情况(尤其是隐性债务)的尽职调查稍有不慎,极有可能会导致并购企业陷入泥潭而万劫不复。因此,文章针对企业(商行为主体)在并购实践中目标公司存在的隐性债务及其相关问题,在理论上进行深入分析研究,更好地为企业并购法律服务者的并购实践提供指引,进一步服务于新时代市场经济商事主体的健康发展。

关键词: 股权收购, 隐性债务, 防范机制

Abstract:

The theory of acquisition motivation holds that the company can eliminate or control its competitors in order to improve its own strength and maintain the advantageous position and competitive advantage of market competition based on the pressure of market operation competition. But if the firm’s due diligence on target firms, particularly recessive debt, in the pre-merger, is likely to lead to the merger of mergers and acquisitions. Therefore, this paper discusses the implicit debt of the target company in the practice of merger and acquisition in theory, so as to provide guidance for the legal service providers of m&a, and further serve the healthy development of business subjects.

Key words: equity acquisition, hidden debt, prevention mechanism

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